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INTRODUCTION

Human rights are articulable expressions of legal ideas that can
be readily identified. The developments of the last thirty-five
years have created a duality of sources from which fundamental
rights of the individual derive. There are, on the one hand, national human rights. They derive from the constitution and the
laws of each nation, from its traditions, values and other elements
that make up what may be appropriately called the "national
human rights culture." They are expressive of the specific needs
* Dr. Pechota, currently a Visiting Scholar of the School of Law, Columbia
University, served as Principal Legal Adviser for the Czechoslovak Ministry of

Foreign Affairs from 1965 to 1968. His publications include THE QuIEr APPROACH: A STUDY OF THE GOOD OFFICES EXERCISED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SEC-

RETARY GENERAL IN THE COURSE OF PEACE (2d ed. 1977). He was associated with
the Charter 77 movement.
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of each society and indicate the purposes for which governments
are created. They necessarily differ from one country to another.
For example, Soviet legislation will never duplicate the Bill of
Rights of the United States Constitution'nor can United States
civil rights legislation be expected to comport with the Soviet
Constitution.
Despite these differences international human rights have
emerged. They are a product of the universal human rights culture built on faith "in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large
and small,"' and on the conviction that respect for the fundamental freedoms of the individual is an indispensable condition for
peace. Because of these beliefs, governments have accepted the
concept of universal human rights, agreed that they are appropriate for international concern, cooperated in defining them, assumed international obligations to respect them, and submitted
to some international scrutiny as to their compliance with these
obligations.2
It is essential to bring these two sets of sources closer together
and to find a mode of converging national and universal standards into a single system of human rights guarantees. The critical elements in this synthesis are international instruments such
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' the International
Covenants on Human Rights, 4 and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 5 These instruments
not only set forth binding standards that ought to be followed but
also provide for measures of domestic and international implementation of the rights. At the same time, they serve as springboards for independent actions by the citizenry in the cause of
human dignity.
According to a principle that has been expressed in several
sources of international law, whenever a conflict between international standards and national laws and regulations arises, the pro1. Preamble to the U.N. CHARTER.
2. See lecture by L. Henkin, Rights: American and Human, Center for the
Study of Human Rights, Columbia University (Apr. 2, 1979).
3. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
4. G.A. Res. 2200 A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
5. Conference on Security and Cooperationin Europe:Final Act [hereinafter Final Act], Helsinki, Aug. 1975, reprinted in 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 323
(1975), 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1923 (1975). See Appendix A.
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vision giving protection to the rights of the individual should apply.' National laws conforming to or exceeding international
standards preserve their full autonomy, while international standards take precedence over domestic legislation when domestic
recognition of individual rights does not meet those standards.
Quite naturally, a domestic legal system and international standards cannot be expected to interact without problems. Despite
its antiquity as a moral concept, human rights is a relatively new
area of international regulation and one which still requires a
great deal of exploration and implementation. Generally, there is
a lack of legal tradition in implementing international treaties
bearing upon the status of the individual domestically. It is little
suprise, then, that states are not accustomed to responding to the
demands of international law with the same sense of obligation
they feel when confronted with well-established and tested concepts. Many of them consider international human rights as a
sort of "soft law" which lacks a regulative means of enforcement
that could underpin its authority. A subconscious resistance to
surrendering the freedom of action in a field that is regarded as
one of the remaining bastions of unrestricted sovereignty further
accounts for states' ambivalence toward the international standards of human rights. Preoccupation with defensive vigilance
makes states believe that for every thought regarding limitation
of their freedom of action, there must be ten for its preservation.
The ordinary processes of international enforcement of universal standards have been rejected by some states as an improper
intervention in their internal affairs because of their jealous guard
of sovereignty. Compliance with human rights obligations consequently is influenced by a balancing of state interests, imaginary
or real, which too often tilts toward an almost atavistic demand
for security and other elements encouraging authoritarian interference with the rights of the individual. Such an approach necessarily produces an order of priorities in which human rights become an expendable commodity.
The exclusion of international scrutiny leads to a situation in
which human rights must rely for their application solely on the
process of composite self-restraint by the government. The forces
which bring about self-restraint, such as fear of negative public
opinion, moral views of government officers, and institutional re6. E.g., Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 5, supra note 4.
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sistance to breaking rules, are not of equal strength in all countries. Where democratic traditions are lacking and blind obedience to the dictates of the power center overshadows the moral
sentiments of the bureaucracy, or where the rule of law has not
established itself as the fundamental principle of the system of
government, the stimuli for compliance are incomparably weaker
than in countries where the whole governmental structure would
be jeopardized if their officiary ignored independent opinion, disregarded moral principles, or denied institutional autonomy in
pursuing the rule of law.
Exacerbated ideological differences also account for the resistance to international scrutiny. Although diverse cultures will
probably always express human rights in idiosyncratic ways and
be open to varying interpretations in different national and ideological settings, it is important to ensure that the issue of human
rights is isolated from the ideological struggle with which it has so
often been intermixed during periods of international tension.
Unfortunately, the defensive mentality of the Cold War is still
very much alive today, and the Helsinki process has been slow in
changing it. It is important, therefore, that states stop using
human rights as a means of scoring propaganda victories or, even
worse, of utilizing weak spots in the adversary's political system
for advancing special political or strategic interests. Accordingly,
it will remain a test of statesmanship for all governments concerned to resist temptation to use human rights concerns for
these purposes.
The participants of the Helsinki Conference seem to have realized that the problem involved in implementing human rights
standards was not achievement of doctrinal or ideological unity
but rather agreement concerning rights, including the realization
and defense of those rights-which might be justified on highly
divergent philosophical grounds. They dealt with the issue, therefore, in the context of international cooperation, and they provided for sustained progress through: (1) a thoughtful but energetic diplomacy striving for constructive dialogue and practical
problem-solving, and (2) involvement in this endeavor of the actor most directly concerned-the individual himself.
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POBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION

7
The term "implementation," as used in the Helsinki Final Act,
refers to appropriate unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures undertaken by signatory states for the purpose of encouraging respect for human rights and promoting the efficacy of international guarantees built into the Helsinki system. It focuses on
measures of a cooperative nature, but it in no way precludes the
use of feasible means of international scrutiny and-in a broader
context of international legal obligations relevant to the purposes
of the Helsinki system-use of sanctions, when necessary.
As an implementation measure, cooperation, including discussion, does not seem to give rise to practical difficulties. Obviously,
all the parties, the Soviet Union and other states of Eastern Europe not excluded, are agreed that exchanges of opinions on how
a state complies with its human rights obligations constitute a
normal means of implementation.8 Problems arise when measures
of scrutiny and enforcement are contemplated. Few, if any, are
explicitly defined in the Helsinki Final Act and some are even
excluded by reason of the uncertain legal status of the instrument
and the absence of a general agreement by the parties to resort to
institutionalized third-party procedures, such as arbitration or
adjudication. Most of the problems, however, are inherent in the
very purpose of a system which makes the observance of fundamental rights of the individual a matter of common concern to all
the signatories. In the field of human rights, as in other fields
where states seek to give expression to a shared interest, the

7.
8.

See, e.g., Final Act, supra note 5 at Basket I, Principle X.
Compare the element of consensus in the polemical response of a spokes-.

man for the Soviet Foreign Ministry to Western statements concerning the legitimacy of monitoring activities: "Our answer to those persons is that no one has

given you the right to check up on others, especially when the others are independent, sovereign states. If you want to exchange opinions, that's another
matter." 29 CURRENT DIG. SovmT PRESS No. 6 at 5 (1977). Compare also the
following statement of the United States Government: "The United States

welcomes criticism of its record as natural and constructive. The U.S. does not,
for example, consider discussion of its own record by foreign governments to be
contrary to Principle VI of the Final Act, which concerns noninterference in internal affairs. Implementation of the Final Act by any signatory is clearly a legitimate concern of all signatories." SIXTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE ON THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL AcT, DEP'T STATE SPECIAL REP. No. 54

at 3 (July 1979).
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problem is not merely one of drawing up agreements but of seeing
that agreements are effectively applied. It is therefore natural to
expect that states would raise their voices whenever, in their
judgment, such agreements are not fulfilled and the purposes for
which they were concluded demand such response. The right to
urge compliance and to protest against infringements of the obligations assumed by the Helsinki signatories obviously constitutes
a legitimate means of manifesting the international interest in the
name of the system created by the Helsinki Final Act.9
Outside the Helsinki context, the Soviet Union and its allies
have recognized the right of the international community to
speak out in defense of fundamental human rights. On many occasions the Soviets themselves have demanded or supported other
countries in demanding an international censure of specific
human rights violations. They have actively sought international
action against violations of human rights in Chile and South Africa and have supported the creation of special bodies "to investigate violations of human rights by fascist and military governments" on the ground that "the policy pursued by military-fascist
dictatorships negates the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter and is accompanied by mass and- systematic violations of elementary human rights and freedoms." 10
As regards their own performance, however, the Soviet Union
and other East European countries continue to regard any form
of outside attention as an inadmissible intervention in their internal affairs. In referring to the agenda for the Belgrade Follow-Up
Conference before the U.N. General Assembly in 1977, Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko declared: "Any attempts at preaching
to us, at reading us sermons or, still worse, at interfering in our
domestic affairs under contrived pretexts, have encountered and
will always encounter a most resolute rebuff."1 1
It is surely desirable that no attempts be made to set the clock
of international development back to the time when all international attention to the human condition was regarded as improper
penetration into the realm of national control. While it must be
9. Cf. Schachter, Book Review, 17
(HUMAN

RIGHTS,

INTERNATIONAL LAW

COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
AND THE HELSINKI

L. 535 (1978),

ACCORD,

ergenthal, ed. 1977)).
10. Kartashkin, Human Rights and Peaceful Coexistence, 9
DROITS DE L'HOMME, No. 1 at 14 (1976).
11. 32 U.N. GAOR (8th Plen. mtg.) 105 (1977).

(T. Bu-

REVUE DES
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recognized that non-interference in another sovereign's internal
affairs is a sound principle which has relevance to matters of
human rights, the mere fact that a state presses its claim of sovereignty cannot render the principle operative. The principle will
remain inapplicable in all instances where a purported external
action-be it a mere comment, friendly advice, reminder, quiet
approach on behalf of a victim, or a more audible form of disapproval such as public censure, diplomatic representation, complaint to an international body or, in serious cases, retaliation-is
clearly in response to an infringement of the obligations owed to
the Helsinki community.
The issue arises time and again in different contexts and in relation to diverse sets of circumstances. For instance, at the 1979
session of the U.N. General Assembly, when confronted with a
call for the release of six human rights activists convicted by a
court in Prague, Czechoslovakia contended that the delegations
expressing their concern were interfering in its internal affairs
and were thereby violating international law. 12 In reply to the
contention, the United States representative said:
If nations are parties to declarations, covenants, treaties or accords, and violations of such agreements are alleged, it is the
right-no, it is the duty-of signatory powers to ask what those
agreements mean and whether they are truly intended to be
honored. To arrest and criminally indict and imprison individuals
who have only exercised rights guaranteed them by international
agreements obligates those who wish agreements to have real
meaning to speak out in protest.1"
The official position of most East European countries is that
the Helsinki Accord confers no rights directly on the individual,
and that any international undertakings in the human rights field
are applicable only within the framework of the legal and political
systems of each participating state. Soviet and East European
writers, when addressing themselves to the issue, invariably argue
that international commitments in this area are transformed by
the peculiarities of the social system in which they are applied
and that the character of the socio-economic system determines
the scope of implementation of human rights. It is, therefore, not
12. Debate before the Third (Social, Cultural and Humanitarian) Committee
of the U.N. General Assembly (press release, Oct. 26, 1979).
13. See statement by Ambassador van den Heuvel before the Third Committee of the General Assembly. Id.
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surprising that despite the conclusion of international agreements
containing a list of human rights, the real scope and guarantee of
their implementation by the signatory countries is often drastically different.1 4 The Western signatories, in general, are prepared
to accept the premise that the state is the normal agency for the
protection of rights. They are unwilling, however, to subscribe to
the view that the scope and contents of universal human rights
standards may change, through a process of integration with domestic law, such that virtually no room is left for comparison with
the universal standards and, consequently, for a meaningful scrutiny of performance by the community of nations.
There is wide support in private circles in the Soviet Union and
in Eastern Europe for the view that the Helsinki Final Act has
established a legitimacy of international concern about compliance with its human rights provisions. As should be expected,
that support is manifest first by the statements of human rights
activists who hold that failure to show some degree of international solidarity with victims of human rights violations constitutes acquiescence to their fate incompatible with the solemn
Helsinki pledge to uphold jointly the international standards of
human rights. The activists generally disclaim their governments'
tendencies to reject all international attention to the situation of
human rights in their countries as impermissible interference. As
Andrei D. Sakharov stated, "To assert that the defense of human
rights is interference in internal affairs of any country would
mean to refute these documents' validity."1 The Charter 77
movement in Czechoslovakia has made it a cornerstone of its policy to regard implementation of international standards as "a
common affair of all states" and has not hesitated to call the attention of international bodies, both intergovernmental and nongovernmental, to gross violations of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of Czechoslovak citizens.1
The differences in attitudes and opinions between Eastern and
Western nations concerning implementation of international
14. Cf. Kartashkin, Soueshchanie po Bezopasnosti i Sotrudnichestvu v
Evrope i Prava Cheloveka (Conference on European Security and Human
Rights), 4 SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO (Moscow) 91 (1976).
15. A. SAKHAROV, ALARM AND HOPE 138 (1978).
16. See, e.g., the letter of Charter 77 addressed to the representatives of the

signatory states assembled for the First Review Conference at Belgrade in
WHITE PAPER ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA (International Committee for the Support of

Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, pub.) (Paris 1977).

EAST EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS

Spring-Summer 1980]

human rights standards show clearly the weaknesses inherent in
the Helsinki Final Act. Lack of an effective implementation
mechanism was responsible for the failure of the Belgrade Review
Conference in 1978. Inability to provide such a mechanism in Belgrade does not augur well for the success of the Madrid meeting
in 1980. There is an evident need to define areas in which criticism of human rights performance is fully compatible with respect for existing social and political systems and cannot, under
any circumstances, be regarded as an affront to the fundamental
principles on which the socialist societies of East European countries are based. If, for instance, the West proceeded according to a
perfectionist theory that human rights concerns cannot be satisfied until the political systems in Eastern Europe have undergone
fundamental changes, they would risk provoking discord that
would make the application of the Helsinki standards impractical.
It should not be expected that the Soviet Union would ever accept the notion of democracy as it is defined in the West, just as
the Western countries would regard the political principles enshrined in the Soviet system as unacceptable for themselves.
There is an additional reason for restraint by the West. For the
Soviet Union and other East European countries, any attempt to
formulate the issue of human rights in terms of representative
democracy calls into question the legitimacy of their present political system. The Helsinki Accord itself is silent on the question
of democracy; but even without such direct linkage, it has considerable potential for stimulating crises of legitimacy in connection
with human rights. Consequently, the present regimes in Eastern
Europe are very sensitive about any external or internal criticism
of the ways in which their political systems actually function.
Most of the human rights movements respect the borderline domestically, and certainly do not encourage its trespass by international action. For instance, in a February 1, 1980, statement reassessing its role and political aspirations, the Czechoslovakian
Charter 77 unequivocally declared that "it has no intention of
changing the existing social system" and that it wants only "to
consolidate Czechoslovak statehood by pressing for the observance of laws guaranteed to its citizens by the Constitution of the
Republic and supplemented by international pacts on human and
political rights.

' 17

17. Charter 77 Assesses Future Role After Three Years' Persecution,The
Times (London), Mar. 2, 1980.
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THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

It would be an easy and essentially incorrect generalization to
suggest that the countries of the East European region fail to live
up to international standards in every respect. There are clearly
areas where their human rights record is commendable, for instance where economic, social, and cultural policies guarantee education, free medical care, and complete health and social insurance for every citizen. The record of compliance with most civil
rights is mixed. Political rights are granted only to the extent to
which their exercise serves the purpose of strengthening the existing form of government. Of course, there are important differences among individual countries; even within the same country,
there are periods of relative tolerance and periods of bigotry. Almost everywhere, however, one finds discrimination-political, religious, sometimes even national and racial.
Existing constitutional provisions do not sanction every departure from the universal standards of human rights. In fact, the
constitutions by and large are consonant with the terms of the
Universal Declaration and the International Covenants on
Human Rights. What, then, accounts for the paradoxical situation characterized, on the one hand, by the existence of laws and
treaty commitments expounding fair human rights standards and,
on the other hand, by a less than satisfactory performance in putting many of them into effect?
First, the rights of the individual are recognized in practice insofar as they are compatible with the interests of the socialist
state, as perceived by the ruling communist party and the government. Loyalty and obedience to the state purpose are elevated to
the status of fundamental articles of faith which every citizen is
supposed to embrace if he or she wishes to avoid a stigma of social unworthiness.
Preoccupation with security, both internal and external, is the
second factor. Rigid discipline in the society sustained by a mixture of ideological campaigns and police pressure is seen as the
only available means to hold in check anti-socialist tendencies
within the country and ward off perceived external dangers such
as ideological subversion and economic enticement.
In periods of political orthodoxy or international tension, the
effect of the above policies on human rights can be suffocating as
in Czechoslovakia today. There are, in fact, two sets of constitutional provisions in operation, each conflicting with the other.

"Spring-Summer1980]
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There is one constitution known to all' s and a second, secret one,
composed of internal directions, party resolutions and departmental instructions. The former sets forth principles which, if
conscientiously applied, would guarantee to every citizen a fair
standard of rights. The latter, however, makes these principles
largely inoperative. It authorizes state agencies to use extra-legal
means of pressure, introduces rules discriminating against certain
categories of citizens, and interferes with the administration of
justice. This second "constitution," of course, introduces an element of arbitrariness and creates an atmosphere of uncertainty.
The normal processes of law are thus obstructed and citizens affected by the unpublished rules and regulations have no effective
remedy.
Few people in Eastern Europe have ever read Henry David
Thoreau's essay on the duty of civil disobedience, but many are
familiar in practice with the dilemma that arises in connection
with unjust laws: "shall we be content to obey them, or shall we
endeavor to amend them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or shall we transgress them at once?""" The answer is not
easy. Human rights activists in Eastern Europe have come to realize that there is no one way to guarantee human rights in their
complicated world.
Some activists believe that their major emphasis must be on
domestic efforts including moral commitments by individuals to
the public constitution; they seek to ensure existence of a citizenry conscious of its rights and vigilant against their erosion.
They are convinced that even a small space won for independent
and free human rights activity is a space for genuine life in spite
of all the negative trends and disruptive effects of an undemocratic political system.
Others tend to look outwardly to an international support system. These activists maintain that external criticism, prompted
by concrete cases brought to the attention of responsive international actors have some inhibiting effect on the faulty governments. The Czechoslovak human rights activists used this technique with some success in 1977. The International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions brought before the International Labor Organization repressive measures of the Czechoslovak authorities
18. For the text of the 1960 Czechoslovak Constitution see 4 CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 12-16 (A. Blaustein and G. Pflanz eds. 1974).
19. 1 ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 1483 (2d ed. 1980).
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affecting employment of authors and other signatories of Charter
77.20

Irrespective of strategic preference for either internal or external pressure on governments, all human rights activists agree that
any advance toward more individual freedom is contingent upon
an improved atmosphere in the East-West relationship. They
share the view that "only detente created the possibility of exerting even minimal influence on both the domestic and foreign policies of the socialist countries," and that "in the name of detente
they are required to accommodate their actions to universal hu' 21
manitarian standards."
IV.

CITIZEN INITIATIVES

As a consequence of detente, the issue of human rights has
burst forth into wide discussion, both within national societies
and on an international scale. The Helsinki Final Act proclaimed
in Principle VII "the right of the individual to know and act upon
rights and duties." The essence of the provision seeks to ensure
that there is a citizenry conscious of its rights and duties and able
to obtain a speedy and effective remedy when the rights and freedoms of the individual are being violated. It means that the government may not by any method whatsoever curb use of any procedure essential to the vindication of individual claims, nor may
it resort to intimidation or repression to deter the individual from
non-violent actions in defense of his or her rights. Citizens have
thus been given a point of reference. The human rights provisions
20. The complaint alleged that the government had taken repressive measures affecting the employment of authors and signatories of Charter 77, a manifesto which brought to public attention criticism of the government's policy on
human rights. According to the individual notifications and judicial decisions
attached to the representation of the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions, dismissals and other measures affected the employment of workers because they had signed or supported, or refused to condemn, Charter 77. Court
decisions held, in particular, that these dismissals had been validly carried out

under the Labor Code. Those actions constituted violations of the ILO Convention on Discrimination in Employment and Occupation which prohibits "any
exclusion or preference made on the basis of. . .political opinion. . . which
has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in
employment or occupation." The case was considered by a committee set up by
the Governing Body of ILO and the Governing Body itself, which led to the
publication of findings. See INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, 61 OFF. BULL. Ser. A.,
No. 3, Supp. [hereinafter ILO BULL.] at 10-11 (1978).
21. SAKHAROV, supra note 15 at 25-26.
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of the Final Act have been viewed, particularly in Eastern Europe, as a sort of international guarantee of the security of the
individual and as a springboard for individual claims against the
government.
Armed with copies of the Helsinki Final Act, which have been
widely disseminated throughout Eastern Europe, thousands of
citizens have sought redress of their individual grievances. Even
greater numbers have been addressing the authorities on issues
involving participation in public life, international exchanges and
the benefits of free travel. Apart from individual assertions of
human rights, there have emerged collective initiatives by groups
of concerned citizens seeking a constructive dialogue with the authorities on human rights issues. These groups have been calling
attention to individual cases where human rights are violated,
documenting grievances suggesting individual remedies, and making recommendations on ways of improving the general situation.
They have also been striving to foster public awareness of human
rights and to offer their fellow citizens "a way out of the labyrinth
of manipulation, fear and resignation. ' 2 2 Charter 77 in Czechoslo-

vakia is a case in point.
On January 1, 1977, a group of 257 Czechoslovak citizens signed
a manifesto reminding the political and state authorities of their
duty to ensure strict observance of the rights guaranteed to all
citizens by the Constitution, the International Covenants on
Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act. The movement has
become the focal point of almost all private human rights activities in Czechoslovakia. The Charter 77 manifesto points out:
Tens of thousands of our citizens are prevented from working in
their own fields for the sole purpose that they hold views differing
from official ones [and] are discriminated against and harassed in
all kind of ways by the authorities and public organizations ....
[C]ountless young people are prevented from studying because of
their own views or even their parents' .

. .

. [F]reedom of public

expression is inhibited by the centralized control of all the communication ....

[Any exercise of the right to seek, receive and im-

part information and ideas] is followed by extra-judicial and even
judicial sanctions, often in the form of criminal charges ....
"[F]reedom of religious confession ... is continually curtailed by
arbitrary official action ....
[The rights to privacy, family, home

and correspondence] are seriously vitiated by the various forms of
22. The Times, supra note 17.
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interference in the private life of citizens exercised by the Ministry
of the Interior, for example by bugging telephones and houses,
opening mail, following personal movements, searching homes, setting up networks of neighborhood informers. . . .In cases of prosecution on political grounds, the investigative and judicial organs
violate the rights of those charged and of those defending them
. . . .[T]he prison treatment of those sentenced in such cases is an
affront to their human dignity and a menace to their health, being
aimed at breaking their morale.
. . .The right to leave the coun23
try is consistently violated.
An important element in the philosophy of Charter 77 is "the
sense of co-responsibility for the conditions that prevail and for
the observance of legally binding standards of human rights," as
well as the "belief in the importance of its conscious public acceptance and the general need to give it new and more effective
expression." To ward off charges of illegal political activities, the
movement affirms that "Charter 77 is not an organization" and
that "it does not aim. . . to set out its own platform of political
or social reform or change." The international thrust of the movement is emphasized by the statement that "like many similar citizen initiatives in various countries, West and East, it seeks to
promote the general public interest," as well as by the mandate
given to its spokesmen "to represent it vis-A-vis state and other
2' 4
bodies, and the public at home and abroad.
While the authorities usually tolerate individual petitions since
they do not question the discretionary power of the state to make
decisions and choices it deems appropriate, the collective initiatives meet with official hostility. They are viewed as attempts to
erode the foundations of the socialist society by introducing into
the political process a dimension of pluralism alien to the existing
system.
The reaction of the Czechoslovak authorities to Charter 77 has
been especially harsh. In the months following the proclamation
of the Manifesto, its signatories-now numbering more than one
thousand individuals from all walks of life-were subjected to police harassment, interrogation, and even arrest. Typing, distribution, and even mere possession of a copy of the manifesto were

23.

For the full text of the Charter and related documents see WHITE PAPER,

supra note 16 at 53-56. See also Appendix C reprintedfrom ILO BULL., supra
note 20 at 54-55.
24. All quotations are from Charter 77.
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regarded as acts of subversion or incitement punishable by law. A
number of criminal charges were brought against both signatories
and non-signatories alike. The Prosecutor General issued a statement on January 31, 1977, binding upon the administrative and
judicial bodies, which declared that Charter 77 "is levelled at
state structure and socialist society" since "it affirms with the aid
of lies that Czechoslovakia constantly violates human rights and
the law that its citizens are exposed to oppression as bad as
apartheid.

' 25

He maintained that the movement "calls for actions

incompatible with Article 29 of the Constitution, and, contrary to
Articles 19, 29 and 34 of the Constitution, demands the organiza' The Chartists retion of anti-socialist and anti-state activities."26
plied to the Prosecutor General's charge by issuing a statement to
the effect that: "Charter 77 is entirely within the law, particularly
Articles 28 and 29 of the Constitution which guarantees the right
'27
of petition.

Despite Charter 77's response, the statement of the Prosecutor
General was taken as a legal ground for dismissing about 100 persons from their jobs in various sectors of industry, administration,
education, and culture. Most lost their jobs because they had
signed the Manifesto. The reasons given by their employers included assertions that the signing of Charter 77 was "a serious
offense against the interests of the working class and a serious
infringement of socialist work discipline," "a direct threat to the
safety of the Republic and, above all, to the integrity of the structure of the state and its international relations," and even "a
criminal offence." 2 8 Some non-signatories were suspended from
their positions merely because they refused to join in an official
campaign against Charter 77. In a letter of dismissal delivered to
a young teacher, the Board of Education in the city of Ceske
Budejovice substantiated its action as follows: "Your attitude...
raised doubts as to your ability to cope with your other obligations consisting in educating your pupils to become valuable and
'29
devoted members of socialist society.

25.

See ILO BULL., supra note 20 at 52.

26. Id. For text of the 1960 Constitutional provisions, supra note 18.
27. Charter 77 Doc. No. 3 in Violations of Civil and Political Rights in
Czechoslovakia 129 (Council of Free Czechoslovakia, Wash. D.C., 1977). See also
WHITE PAPER, supra note 16.
28. ILO BULL., supra note 20 at 11-35.
29.

Id. at 32.
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In respect to both the individual petitions and the collective
initiatives, the tendency in most East European states has been
to divest the claims of their immediate external inspiration. In
other words, the notion that the Helsinki Final Act or the International Covenants on Human Rights have created rights for the
individual or that international agreements provide a legal basis
for individual complaints or group demands vis-A-vis one's own
government is dismissed. The perception that individual grievances based on international norms challenge the supremacy of
state power is perhaps the dominant factor in government attitudes toward human rights movements. Governments want their
societies to be dependent on their initiatives and to accept their
interpretations of the scope and meaning of human rights. The
Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, the supreme legislative organ,
adopted in April 1977, a special resolution on the state of civil
and political rights which provided that Czecholsovakia, "through
its existing legal system fulfills all obligations deriving

. . .

from

the ratified international conventions" and, in many instances,
"goes beyond the scope of the rights expressed in them."'30 The
same self-righteous position was taken a year later in a written
report on the implementation of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, submitted by the government to the
Human Rights Committee. 1 It is plain that assertions contrary to
this official position must invariably be perceived by the regime
as deviant and hostile to its fundamental political and ideological
tenets.
Although the International Covenants on Human Rights, as
well as other human rights treaties signed and ratified,82 have become part of the East European states' legal systems, and their
provisions should therefore be directly enforceable in courts, no
East European court has acknowledged their applicability in liti30. Rude Pravo (Prague), Apr. 6, 1977.
31. See Report submitted by Czechoslovakia under Article 40 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Doc. CCPR/C/1/add.12. See
also the statement of the government representative before the Committee, Jan-

uary 27, 1978, Doc. CCPR/C/SR.64 at 2.
32. Among them, of particular importance in the present context are the
Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (ILO, 1954), the Convention against Discrimination in Education
(UNESCO, 1960), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (U.N., 1966).
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gation.33 Individual claims that invoke these provisions are re-formulated by the court in terms of corresponding domestic laws.
For example, in October 1979, six human rights activists were
tried in Prague. The judge interrupted a defendant who referred
to the International Covenants in his final speech and ordered the
reference to be removed from the record of the court
34
proceedings.
Even more repugnant in the eyes of the government than public reference to international human rights standards is the idea
that a group of private persons might organize a defense against
infringements of its members' rights and communicate this purpose to others. This aspect of the "right to know and act" guaranteed by Principle VII is being totally rejected by the authorities
in the East European countries. When communication with concerned and responsive groups abroad is involved, members of
such groups may often be charged with criminal offenses.
The case of the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly
Prosecuted (VONS) in Czechoslovakia provides a good example.3 5
A group of concerned citizens, most of them signatories of Charter 77, established the Committee in the spring of 1978, to monitor the cases of persons who were imprisoned or otherwise persecuted for their political beliefs in violation of international
standards of human rights. The Committee issues reports and
statements containing accurate information on actions taken by
the authorities against such persons, sends observers to their trials and organizes support and relief for their families. In May
1979, a certain number of the members were arrested and charged
with setting up,
an illegal organization, the objective of which was to arouse mistrust and hostility against the socialist state system of the Republic and vilify it internationally by slanders that in Czechoslovakia
citizens are being summarily and unlawfully prosecuted for their
33. During the consideration of the Czechoslovak report in the Human

Rights Committee, some members of the Committee specifically inquired
whether any judgment based on the interpretation of the provisions had been

handed down. See doc. CCPR/C/SR.64 at 13. The question was completely ignored by the government representative in his final comments. See doc. CCPR/
C/SR.66 at 2-10.

34. See an account of the trial of Vaclav Havel et alia held in Prague in
October 1979, by Wright in 2 Zapad (Toronto) No. 1 at 12 (Feb. 1980).
35. See Skilling, Czech Human Rightists under Fire Again, The Globe and
Mail (Toronto), Aug. 24, 1979.
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6

The charge added, with ominous emphasis, that the defendants
"carried out their criminal activity in collaboration with certain
foreign representatives and institutions disseminating anti-Czechoslovak propaganda,

'3 7

and that "it has been adequately proved

that foreign inflammatory propaganda against Czechoslovakia
made full use of the materials obtained by the defendants and
that all defendants agreed with this." 8 The trial of six selected
members of the Committee, including the playwright Vfclav
Havel, journalist Jiri Dienstbier and philosopher Viclav Benda,
took place in October 1979. Although the prosecution was not
able to substantiate the charge that the accused had acted with
the intent "to subvert the Republic," all six human rights activists were convicted and sentenced to several years of
imprisonment."
The Prague trial raised a cardinal issue of human rights protection under the Helsinki Final Act-that is, the right of people in
the participating countries to organize citizen groups to monitor
the actions of governments relating to the rights affirmed by the
Final Act. Effective protection of human rights, particularly when
an international obligation is to be carried out in the domestic
context, depends to a great extent on public control of a government's compliance with its obligations. The influence of independent monitoring activities at many levels is therefore an essential
condition in making the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act
real and effective. Wide international support of groups clamoring
for the implementation of the Final Act is not only appropriate as
an expression of human solidarity but also fully justified, both
morally and juridically. Such support is a logical extension of international concern for human rights. Its legitimacy is sustained
by recent developments in the field which emphasize the role
non-governmental actors play in promoting respect for human
rights.
While the Helsinki Final Act has definitely strengthened the
concept of people-to-people communication, it has left unanswered a number of questions: What channels of communication
36. Quotation from the indictment (unpublished).
37. Amnesty International was specifically mentioned both in the indictment
and during the proceedings.
38. Indictment, supra note 36.
39. 10 Listy (Rome), No. 1, Supp. 17-24 (1980).
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are considered normal? What guarantees does the system provide
to those who risk their personal security and freedom by making
violations of human rights known to their fellow citizens and concerned persons. in other participating countries? These problems
warrant consideration at the Madrid Conference in 1980. Perhaps
the Conference should call upon states which have not yet done
so to create official monitoring bodies and to remove obstacles to
the emergence and normal functioning of unofficial ones. Perhaps
Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act should be supplemented by
an understanding that trials involving persons who have been engaged in monitoring the human rights provisions of the Final Act
should be open to observers from other participating countries.
The emergence of human rights diplomacy poses an interesting
question: Would it be in keeping with the principles of diplomatic
intercourse to shift the focus of human rights policy from governments to societies and thereby establish direct contacts with
groups like Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia in order to help them
gain visibility and recognition in their own countries? In this connection, it may be of interest to note that no rule of international
law prohibits contacts between a foreign diplomatic mission and
citizens of the receiving state; yet few embassies in the capitals of
socialist countries seek contacts with human rights activists for
fear they may arouse the host g6vernment's official displeasure.
An incident relevant to the issue occurred in Prague in October
1978, when the Austrian ambassador invited several persons
known for their association with Charter 77 to dinner. An article
appeared in a Prague daily accusing the ambassador of "a gross
violation of diplomatic privileges" allegedly committed by "conspiring with arch-enemies of socialism."' 0 The daily carefully
listed the "arch-enemies'" names. 1 It would probably be impractical to seek a formal understanding concerning the legitimacy of
contacts between diplomatic representatives and host countries'
citizenry on matters relating to the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act; rather, it should be left to practice. Existing
precedents will undoubtedly continue to make inroads into the
rigid patterns of the diplomatic protocol.
Human rights movements in Eastern Europe are generally

40. Prace (Prague), Oct. 18, 1978.
41. Id. The names include former Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek, playwright
Pavel Kohout, artist Pavel Landovsky, artist Vlasta Chramostova, and singer
Jaroslav Hutka, all prominent members of Charter 77.
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spearheaded by those whose personal and collective destinies are
tied to the removal of political repression, discrimination, and
limitation of individual freedom. 4 2 The Charter 77 movement in

Czechoslovakia, for instance, has grown out of the courageous
protests of men and women who themselves were victims of the
post-1968 persecution and whose moral motives for their action
parallel their political ones. 43 They are aware of the limitations
posed by the geopolitical and psychological factors involved in
shaping collective attitudes in Eastern Europe today, and they refrain from actions which may give the governments an easy pretext for mass retaliation. They are part of the majority, yet they
are singled out by the authorities because they are the more audible part. They differ among themselves as to the philosophical
and political explanation of the human condition in their respective countries, but they are unanimous in their resolve to improve
it. What holds them together is an ideology of human rights
which is essentially pluralistic and which offers each individual a
maximum freedom of-choice. According to Soviet Professor Andrei Sakharov, "[P]recisely this kind of freedom, and not the
pressure exerted by dogmas, authority, traditions, state power or
public opinion, can insure a sound and just solution to those endlessly difficult and contradictory problems which unexpectedly
appear4 in personal, social, cultural, and many other aspects of
4

life."

As can be expected, the governments use every available means
to minimize the impact of the human rights movements on society in their countries. Branding the activists "renegades," "rightwing opportunists," "unrecognized pursuers of fame," and "failed
counter-revolutionaries,"
they mount periodic campaigns
designed to discredit the movements and isolate them from the
rest of the society. They attack the human rights activists for trying to create the impression that "they represent what is almost a
political movement" when in fact, "they are a small minority and
have virtually no impact on the masses.

' 45

At the same time, the

government-inspired campaigns warn against viewing detente and
42. Id.
43. See Vaculik and Havel, Controversy: Why Go to Jail?, INDEX
SHIP No. 5 (1979).

ON CENSOR-

44. Sakharov, The Human Rights Movement in the USSR and Eastern Eu-

rope: Its Goals, Significance, and Difficulties, TRALOGuE, No. 19 at 4 (1978).
45. Rude Pravo (Prague), Oct. 20, 1979.

Spring-Summer 1980]

EAST EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS

the Helsinki process as a "blank check" which obliges the East
European countries "to give wider scope for counter-revolutionary
elements and to grant them the right to disrupt the socialist
state."'46 Within the East European establishments, the hardliners

lead the offensive. They praise the Soviet Union for setting an
inspiring example for workers everywhere "by improving the lot
of the people and ensuring equality, observance of human rights,
and social justice, all of which only real socialism can provide,"
and they dissuade the population from supporting "those who
seek to disrupt our socialist construction in any way in the inter4' 7
est, and with the backing, of foreign reactionaries.

It has long been evident that the governments of the Soviet
Union and other Warsaw Pact countries pursue a coordinated
strategy in their suppression of human rights movements. The
movements, until recently, had little contact with one another
and no coordination of their efforts. An attempt by the Czechoslovak and Polish groups to establish regular contact and joint
plans of action ended in the arrest in 1978 of Dr. Jaroslav Sabata,
a spokesman for Charter 77. Despite intensified repression, however, there has been a noticeable increase in transnational cooperation. Mutually supportive exchanges and integration of activities
among human rights activists, particularly in Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union, have opened up a new chapter in the
history of the East European dissident movement. In a November
1979 message addressed to Charter 77 and to the Polish Self-Defense Committee (KOR), Andrei Sakharov and other prominent
members of the Soviet human rights movement called on those
present "to come forward with a joint statement by human rights
defenders in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR, and to point
out that a common approach to human rights exists in our countries.

'48

Both Polish and Czechoslovak activists have agreed with

the Soviet human rights defenders that the social and political
structures of their respective countries have many common
problems; they have declared their intention to "take part in endeavors which would identify those problems and indicate the
possibility of their resolution.

' 49

46. Id.
47. Milos Jakes, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak
Communist Party in Rude Pravo, Nov. 8, 1979.
48. 9 Listy (Rome), No. 6 at 15 (1979).
49. Id. at 15-16.
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The development of cooperative initiatives by national dissident groups is of great significance for the future. Most past attempts to democratize the East European societies failed partly
because they were confined to one single country each time. This
strategy enabled the Soviet Union to isolate the hotbed and take
appropriate measures to extinguish the movement without arousing much public outcry in other socialist countries. The situation
may be different in the future because of increased individual interaction and increased responsiveness to universal human needs
and aspirations. Even prior to the formation of the coalition and
other direct links among the human rights movements, there was
a high degree of consensus about the problems and needs of the
East European societies. The unprecedented increase in contacts
between individuals within the area in the last decade has undercut the isolation in which almost every East European society
found itself in the 1950's and 1960's. It has also created a new
kind of solidarity and commonality of interests which provides a
natural basis for coordinated response to these problems and
needs. In this process, the human rights groups play the role of a
medium through which people in different socialist countries
come to understand, recognize and act upon their individual and
collective rights.
We must not forget the influence of independent information
on the formation of the common conscience. This aspect of
human rights activity consists of making violations of human
rights known to as many citizens as possible, wherever they may
occur, and in fostering continual public debate on ways and
means to remedy the harms and prevent reoccurrences. For instance, the statements of Charter 77 on violations of human
rights in the sphere of economic and social activity, 50 on violations of the right to work,5 1 on discrimination and repression in
the field of literature, 52 on discrimination against Czechoslovakia's Romany minority,5 3 on restrictions of the freedom to
travel, and on economic problems bearing upon fundamental

50. Charter 77 Doc. No. 7, supra note 27 at 139-42 (Mar. 8, 1977).
51. Charter 77 Doc. No. 11, supra note 27 at 152-59 (May 30, 1977).
52. Charter 77 Doc. No. 12, supra note 27 at 159-63 (June 30, 1977).
53. Charter 77 Doc. No. 23, SUMMARY op AVAILABLE DocuMENTs, No. 11 at 24 (Palach Press 1979) (Dec. 1978).

54. Charter 77 Doc. No. 24, id. at 4-6 (Mar. 26, 1979).
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rights of citizens 55 have provided valuable source material both
for Czechoslovak citizens and for organizations abroad that support the human rights movements in Eastern Europe. The Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted (VONS) has
issued approximately 150 reports on individual cases of persons
who have been prosecuted or who have become victims of unlawful proceedings by the police and the judiciary because of their
beliefs.5 6 Through its efforts many violations of the fundamental
rights of citizens which might otherwise have gone unnoticed have
57
been brought to light.
Although there are limits to what citizen groups can accomplish

in terms of internal implementation of the Helsinki Final Act,
their independent appraisals and judgments have tremendous
moral and educational value. It can certainly be argued, although
not conclusively proven, that in some instances governments may
have heeded appeals from citizens groups, especially where sub-

stantial public outcry has followed exposure of a violation. Even if
a government's response is negative, the issue has been raised
before the public and is not going to go away.

55. Charter 77 Doc. No. 26 (May 25, 1979).
56. These reports have been reproduced in bulletins issued in 1979 and 1980
by Palach Press Ltd., Press and Literary Agency, 19 Earlham House, 35 Mercer
Street, London WC2 9QS.
57. One of the cases publicized by the reports was that of Josef Danisz, a
Prague lawyer, who volunteered in 1977 and 1978 to defend several prominent
signatories of Charter 77, including one of the original spokesmen for the movement, Dr. Jaroslav Sabata. Danisz's conscientious and fearless defense of his clients displeased the authorities who instigated criminal proceedings against him
charging him with insulting public officials and slandering organs of the state.
Not only was Josef Danisz excluded from the Prague City Association of Lawyers in March 1979, he was also brought to trial. The trial took place before the
District Court in Hradec Krflove on January 24, 1980. The public was excluded
from the courtroom. Although Danisz pleaded not guilty and the charges against
him were based on vague and contradictory evidence given by witnesses for the
prosecution, he was convicted and sentenced to ten months imprisonment and
to prohibition of activity as attorney for three years. As he has pointed out in
his appeal, "the court deliberately curtailed his right to defense, particularly by
not admitting evidence proving the truthfulness of those statements which the
defendant had made in reality." Danisz's conviction has been widely regarded by
the informed public opinion in Czechoslovakia as an act of retaliation for his
attitudes as a defense counsel for human rights activists.
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WHAT Lms AHEAD?

In Helsinki, the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe accepted, as a consequence of the comprehensive Final Act,
the principle that human rights must effectively be observed, differences in internal structures of states notwithstanding. Can the
international concern aroused by the agreement be sustained over
a long period of time? Will the diplomacy of human rights, an
expression of that concern, work, or will it be reduced to empty
gestures? And most importantly, will not sudden reversals of policy on either the international or the domestic scene destroy the
balance of interests embodied in the Helsinki system of human
rights protection?
There are three basic viewpoints regarding the future of the
Helsinki process and the possibility of improving the overall record of compliance with human rights in the context of East-West
relationships. First, there is a cynical view. It anticipates more
talk and little action, despite states' declared intentions. It holds
that the fate of human rights can be read from the faces of the
judges sentencing the dissidents to long terms in prison. It asserts
that with the blossoming of what was hailed as detente, the East
European governments were more than ever determined to crush
dissent. While it may be sustained by facts, this assertion is not
necessarily true, for it generalizes despair to such an extent that
it leaves no room for future change.
Secondly, there is an alarmist view. Its proponents ask: As the
repression grows larger and larger, as more and more individuals
are directly affected by repressive measures, will intolerance eventually dominate all government-people relationships? It calls for
forceful international action before it is too late. It visualizes the
possibility of active intervention in the form of political and ideological crusades. It errs mainly by losing a sense of proportion and
contact with reality. It is evident that, if translated into foreign
policy, it would eliminate the very foundation on which the Helsinki Final Act is based.
There is, finally, a sanguine view. It tends to mirror the sentiments expressed by the participants of the Helsinki Conference
and bases its hopes for progress on the prospects for gradual
change in response to domestic activism and international incentives. This view certainly contains an element of truth. For one
thing, people would not acquiesce voluntarily in the dismantling
of the Helsinki system; and those directly threatened by a revival
of the Cold War would fight harder than those with a more gen-
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eral interest in the relaxation of tensions. Nor are the signatory
governments likely to disrupt the operaton of the system, for the
alternative is confrontation and insecurity for both the West and
the East. Even if governments wished at some point in the future
to forget about their signatures under the Helsinki Final Act,
they would not be in the position to cancel its effect. The sheer
strength of the belief of millions of Europeans, both from the
East and the West, in the spirit and letter of the Helsinki Accord
will make the consummation of the Accord an ever-present consideration in the minds of responsible statesmen.
We must not fall into the illusion, however, that the extension
of human rights will occur as a mere consequence of the general
process of relaxation of tensions. The aim must be actively pursued on both the domestic and international levels. The signatories of the Final Act must be prepared to accept the Helsinki undertakings as a whole, refusing to give any. side an excuse for
officially restricting or rejecting the process to the disadvantage of
the individual, and encouraging any step-however
small-toward the improvement of the human condition. While
avoiding confrontation, it is essential to keep up permanent dialogue on all issues, old and new, that remain unresolved. Their
solution lies in negotiations which will acquire momentum as concrete results are achieved. In this way, and in this way only, can
the Helsinki process bring about the necessary change in the attitudes of the Soviet Union and other East European countries,
whose apprehension of the international ambition to protect
human rights has outlived the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.
Perhaps even a generation earlier it would have been inconceivable to raise the issue of human rights in the context of political
negotiation between the East and the West. Five years ago the
same states were able to reach some agreement on the issue. A
realistic opportunity now exists to complete the task through domestic dialogue and international cooperation in the decade that
lies ahead.
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE

1980

MADRID REVIEW

CONFERENCE

Many of the differences that accounted for the failure of the
Belgrade Conference are still very much in evidence. They must
be expected to emerge anew in Madrid when the participating
States convene later this year to review implementation of the
Final Act and define new tasks. It is essential to ensure that these

492

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13.467

differences are not allowed to jeopardize the outcome of the Madrid Conference, because its failure would probably prove fatal to
the Helsinki process as it was conceived.
What then should be done in Madrid with regard to human
rights? Perhaps even more important than a criticism of particular violations is the need to instill a greater awareness of the relevance of human rights to the Helsinki process-which is synonymous with detente-and to make new arrangements for expanded
coverage of both general and specific human rights issues. There
must be a recognition that disrespect for human rights cannot
create a climate of mutual trust and that human rights considerations are an essential component of the integrated approach to
problems upon which peaceful and cooperative relations between
the East and the West hinge. The aim should be not only to seek
satisfaction of the most -pressing humanitarian concerns but also
to reaffirm the claim to a normal and permanent international interest in the security and welfare of the individual.
The areas in which additional agreement should be sought in
order to enlarge the Helsinki consensus and to make the human
rights provisions more effective, include the following:
A.

The Legal Status of the Helsinki Final Act

Ever since the Helsinki Conference, the essential character of
its product has been the subject of controversy. Most of the arguments center on the question whether or not the Final Act constitutes an international treaty legally binding its signatories. It
should be noted that the document itself is rather vague on the
question. Outwardly, it has the appearance of a treaty. Neither
the process of its negotiation nor the way in which its principal
provisions were drafted shows any notable departure from the
usual method of treaty making. Nor does its appellation necessarily imply that something less than an international treaty was
intended. As to its contents, very little suggests that it should be
regarded as a mere letter of intent; its provisions lay down rules
of conduct for common observance and plainly evidence a meeting of the minds of the parties over the obligations they were disposed to assume. Yet through a seemingly bizzare quirk in drafting, the signatories deflected assumptions about its treaty status
by declaring that it was not eligible for registration as a treaty
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under Article 102 of the U.N. Charter. 5

The margin of uncertainty concerning the Final Act's legal status was further widened by a reference to "the high political significance which the participating States attach to the results of
the Conference" 59 and by several delegations' statements extolling
the paramount political value of the document. Only the United
States delegation made it explicit that in its view the Final Act
did not involve a "legal" commitment. Whether or not the consideration that an international treaty would have to be submitted
to the Senate for its advice and consent prior to its acceptance
was the sole motivation cannot be determined.60 The fact remains, however, that in the subsequent periods the United States
and other signatories have referred to the Final Act as if it constituted a binding agreement and have been invoking its various
provisions in situations which call for legal assessment.6 1
On the Soviet side, there has been a tendency to distinguish
between the legally binding nature of the Declaration of Principles and the recommendatory or programmatic character of other
provisions encompassed by so-called Baskets I, Il and In.62 Most
of the other signatories have remained non-committal insofar as
the status of the Final Act is concerned.6 3
The "twilight existence" of the instrument in international law
inevitably casts a shadow on the strength of the Helsinki system,
58. Final Act, supra note 5, at Follow-Up § 4.
59. Id.
60. See Russell, The Helsinki Declaration:Brobdingnagor Lilliput, 70 AM.
J. INT'L L. 247-48 (1976).
61. This conclusion can be inferred from the statements of the United States
Government referring to obligations under the Final Act "imposed on all its signatories," to "the responsibility to review carefully the performance of all signa-

tories," and to the fact that "implementation of the Final Act by any signatory
is clearly a legitimate concern of all signatories." In recognition of its own obligation, "the Administration also gave renewed attention to examining implementation by the United States within its borders on matters within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government." See SIXTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT supra note

8 at 2-3.
62. See, e.g., Grigelionis, Concerning the Legal Nature of the Final Act of
the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (in Russian), SoViET Y.B. INT'L L. 167 (Moscow 1977).
63. Provost, Observationssur la nature juridique de l'Acte, Finalde la Confrence sur la Securitg et la Cooperationen Europe, 21 ANNUAIE FRANQjS DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 142 (1975).
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particularly in the field of human rights." It is not unwarranted
to expect that the parties themselves will prefer to treat the Final
Act in a legal context, if for no other reason than because this
provides them with the opportunity to talk legitimately with one
another about concerns that would be difficult to voice in a political context. Why not, then, take a bolder step by giving the Final
Act tacit or implicit recognition as a legally binding obligation?
An understanding affirming the legal significance of the Helsinki
Final Act could well be written into the consensus report of the
Madrid Conference.
B.

Publicity for Human Rights

Publicity, free public debate, and education are the media
through which human rights can be better understood, and their
denial, when it occurs, can be made known. It is therefore justifiable to say that they represent one of the essential modes of implementing the Final Act, in particular the provision concerning the
right of the individual to know and act upon his or her rights and
duties in the field. There are several aspects of this publicity issue
which the Madrid Conference might consider. One is the need to
encourage the widest possible dissemination of international instruments relating to human rights in the national languages of
the respective countries. Although the text of the Helsinki Final
Act itself has been widely publicized throughout Europe, the fact
remains that the Soviet Union and some other countries of Eastern Europe have never published the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. In addition, copies of the full text of the International Covenants on Human Rights, to which all East European
states are party, has been made available only in limited numbers. In view of the relevance of both documents to the implementation of the Helsinki human rights commitments, the Madrid Conference should endorse a recent resolution of the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights which calls upon all governments to disseminate the above instruments in their respective
65
territories.
Another issue of concern is citizens' knowledge of all domestic
normative acts which bear upon their fundamental rights and
64. See Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International
Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 300-01 (1977).
65. See U.N. Press Release HR/1936, Mar. 17, 1980.
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freedoms. It should perhaps be agreed that all these acts must be
made not only public but also generally accessible, otherwise they
cannot be applied by the courts or administrative organs. It goes
without saying that, like the laws and other regulations concerning the rights of the individual, lesser normative acts must also
conform to established international standards. An understanding
to this effect would help establish the authority of public human
rights laws in those countries where they have to compete, often
unsuccessfully, with a plethora of unpublished discriminatory
rules and guidelines issued in complete disregard of the constitutional and international rights of the individual.
A third issue relates to the publicity of administrative decisions. Too often the administrative organs in East European
countries impair the rights of citizens by refusing to divulge documents on which their decisions are based and, when acting on individual complaints, by failing to state the reasons for their acts.
Perhaps the Madrid Conference should emphasize that the right
to know and act upon one's rights presumes access to the documents on which a state organ bases its decisions and an explanation of the reasons for particular decisions. Where a decision is
made affecting the rights of an individual, it should not be
enough to assert that the action has been taken in the public interest, for it is also part of the public interest that individual
rights be scrupulously observed. Obviously, this requirement is
relevant to the Final Act, especially to the realization of measures
envisaged in Basket III. What effect, for instance, would the famfly reunification provisions which require participating States to
apply existing procedures for travel documents and visas in a positive and humanitarian spirit have if a citizen must be content
with a stereotypical explanation that his application was rejected
because "the trip is not in the state interest?" 66
Finally, the Madrid Conference might be asked to endorse the
decision of the U.N. Human Rights Commission calling on all
governments concerned to safeguard "the right of ...

citizens

and groups of citizens who endeavor to promote the respect for
human rights. ' 67 This final issue concerns the activities of unoffi66. A Czechoslovak writer who had been denied travel permission on this
ground ironically observed in his appeal: "I do not intend to travel in the state
interest." He took the matter to the Minister of the Interior who acknowledged
his wit and granted the appeal.
67. U.N. Press Release HR/1934, Mar. 17, 1980.
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cial human rights groups which seek to foster a general public
awareness of human rights in their country and to arouse public
vigilance against their erosion. In this connection the Conference
should endorse an interpretation of the right of the individual to
know and act upon his rights, enunciated in Principle VII of the
Helsinki Declaration, which confirms the right of a person to act
in community with others.
C. Status of Monitoring Bodies
It is widely recognized that domestic monitoring activities are
as important for a flawless implementation of the Final Act as is
international scrutiny. In some participating States, official or
semiofficial monitoring bodies have been created; in others,
groups of citizens have assumed the role of informal commentators upon the conduct of their state in fulfilling its human rights
obligations. Acknowledging the useful role of these bodies and
groups, the Madrid Conference could perhaps declare that they
are valuable complements to the existing implementation machinery and that as local outposts of the Helsinki system, they should
enjoy protection. It would also be useful if the delegations would
state publicly that individuals and groups of individuals that
bring human rights violations to the attention of others at home
or abroad are acting within their rights as recognized by the Helsinki Final Act.
D. Human Contacts
Recent international events are raising the painful possibility
that the provisions of Basket III, once the centerpiece of the Final Act, may well be on their way to oblivion. In order to arrest
these developments, it is appropriate to upgrade Basket III by
clarifying and further elaborating on its provisions.
First, it should be made clear that the provisions of Basket III
add to, not detract from, the rights recognized in Principle VII of
the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States. For instance, when Basket III enjoins states to ease
existing restrictions on travel, it takes into account their obligation to respect each individual's liberty of movement and freedom
to choose his or her own residence. While recognizing that states
may lawfully limit that freedom under certain conditions, Basket
III aims at narrowing the areas in which states can lawfully impose restrictions on the exercise of the right. Basket III, therefore,
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does not contradict Principle VII or the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. It should also be made clear that the concept of
incremental, step-by-step improvement adopted by Basket III is
not applicable to the fundamental rights protected under Principle VII or the Covenants. Those rights require immediate and full
implementation.
Secondly, in appraising the strength and deficiencies of Basket
III, the Madrid Conference should take into account the need for
clarifying those provisions which have given rise to different interpretations in practice. For instance, it is desirable to agree
upon a common definition of "family" for the purpose of determining those individuals affected by the provisions promoting
contacts between the reunification of families. It should be
agreed, furthermore, that contacts between people, dissemination
of information, and cultural and educational exchanges will be
furthered without discrimination as to race, sex, language, religion, social status, political affiliations, or opinions of the persons
involved in such exchanges. Any person whose request for requisite permission has been rejected should be entitled to know the
reasons for the rejection; again, it should not be enough to assert
that the action has been taken in the public interest. Since
human contacts and exchanges often reflect the state of bilateral
relations between the governments concerned, which amounts to
discrimination based on criteria extrinsic to the purpose of
human contacts, it would be desirable to set forth an agreed principle that all participating countries shall enjoy, for the purpose
of human contacts and exchanges, equal status.
E. Information
Agreement on guarantees against unacknowledged interception
of books, periodicals, and other publications mailed to individuals
from abroad would be a welcome development.6 8 Generally, there
is a need for relaxation of censorship of both domestic and foreign
publications. For this purpose, the Madrid Conference should try
to define in general terms the notions of "national security,"
"public policy," and "public safety" so often invoked by some
governments as legal grounds for excluding certain kinds of publications from circulation. An international pool of publications by
68. Perhaps the Universal Postal Union might be asked to arrange such an
agreement.
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major publishers from the participating countries could be created and a representative sample of the publications could be
permanently displayed in major cities of the participating States.
The books and publications could be made available to the interested public in reading rooms or on short-term loans.
F.

Culture, Education, and Science

It seems appropriate to reaffirm the principle that works of art,
culture, and science are the sole property of their individual creators (unless freely ceded to another) and that state authorities
cannot prevent authors from publishing or disseminating their
work in other countries. States should be requested to abrogate
laws and regulations which discriminate against authors who publish or present their works abroad without their state's authorization. States should agree upon principles concerning the rights
and duties of individuals participating in cultural, educational, or
scientific exchanges, with a view toward eliminating irrelevant
and discriminatory criteria applied by some states.
G.

Solution of Common Problems

Focusing on cooperative action, the multilateral process is an
appropriate framework for continuing exchanges of views.
Spurred by periodic follow-up conferences, all signatories theoretically should be striving for the solution of outstanding problems
concerning the implementation of the Final Act. Meetings of experts are specifically mentioned in the Final Act as a medium of
such exchange among the participating States.
A topic on which signatories could be invited to exchange views
and solve possible discrepancies is national legislation concerning
acquisition and loss of nationality. Another issue which legal experts might fruitfully discuss is domestic application of Article 14
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights concerning fair trial.6 The Madrid Conference could also encourage
69. Article 14 sets forth the following requirements:
Article 14

1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established

by law. The Press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a
trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordrepublic) or national security
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states to insert into bilateral consular treaties and agreements on
cultural cooperation, as well as into other relevant treaties,
clauses which reaffirm the provisions of Baskets II and III and
in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the
parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the
court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit
at law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons
otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the
guardianship of children.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone
shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not
have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to
him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay
for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under
the same conditions as the witnesses against him;
(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.
4. In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will
take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their
rehabilitation.
5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction
and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.
6. When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal
offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has
been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows
conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who
has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the
unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.
7. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence
for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance
with the law and penal procedure of each country.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4.
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provide for their implementation. Finally, a special international
conference could be considered to discuss the question of "new"
rights not included in the Universal Declaration and the International Covenants.7 0 These rights should be defined in terms of individual claims and in terms of their bearing upon established
rights.
The recommendations suggested for the Madrid Conference
agenda provide an opportunity for constructive discussion of
human rights issues. Their adoption would greatly strengthen the
hand of those in East European countries who rely on the Helsinki Final Act in their struggle for individual rights.

70. There have been proposals to move beyond the civil and political and the
economic, social, and cultural rights recognized in the Universal Declaration and
the International Covenants toward gradual international acceptance of a "third
generation of rights." The third generation would include the rights to peace,
development, and the common heritage of mankind, such as the right to be protected against pollution of the environment. See International Group Urges
Peace as a Human Right, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1979 (an account of the Armand
Hammer Conference of the International Institute of Human Rights, Campobello Island, New Brunswick, Aug. 1979).

